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The free will debate has taken a lot of twists and turns in the past few decades, driven in large part by the twists forced on compatibilists by the so-called ‘Consequence argument’ and by the turns forced on incompatibilists by so-called ‘Frankfurt cases’.​[1]​ Both sides, holding fast to their basic intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, have worked frantically to respond to the respective argument that initially looks devastating to their position. The philosophical work has been ingenious, illuminating, and ultimately … very frustrating to anyone hoping that this philosophical stalemate might budge one way or the other.
	In this paper I will attempt to tie together the reasoning used in the Consequence Argument with the intuitions that drive Frankfurt cases in a way that illuminates some of the underlying differences between the opposing camps. I begin by explaining the ‘basic mechanism’ at work in Frankfurt cases: the existence of sufficient conditions for an outcome that do not actually bring about that outcome. I suggest that other potential threats to free will, such as God’s foreknowledge, can be understood in terms of this basic mechanism. I then turn to the Consequence argument, which concludes that determinism precludes free will, and I adopt the structure of this argument to create parallel ‘progeny’ arguments using the basic mechanism of Frankfurt cases. By thus forcing the Consequence argument and Frankfurt cases into such close proximity, we can see more clearly some of the crucial issues that separate incompatibilists and compatibilists. Doing so will illustrate that for determinism to be a threat to free will requires a particular conception of the laws of nature, one that is more specific and robust than suggested by the Consequence argument alone. I conclude by showing how these questions about laws of nature lead the free will debate towards the mind-body debate and questions about reductionism and supervenience. 

2. The Basic Mechanism in Frankfurt Cases
In 1969 Harry Frankfurt posed a significant challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which states that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done otherwise. PAP is a crucial premise in most incompatibilist arguments, since they suggest that free will and moral responsibility require an unconditional ability to do otherwise and then try to show that determinism entails that no one has this ability. Frankfurt motivates his challenge to PAP by pointing out that “there may be circumstances that constitute sufficient conditions for a certain action to be performed by someone and that therefore make it impossible for the person to do otherwise, but that do not actually impel the person to act or in any way produce his action.”​[2]​ A basic Frankfurt case involves an agent (Fred) deciding whether or not to perform some action—say, voting for George Bush rather than John Kerry on November 2, 2004. A character we’ll call Jeb wants Fred to vote for Bush, but he prefers that Fred decide to do so on his own. So, Jeb, who happens to be a clever neuroscientist, uses his ‘neuroscope’ to monitor Fred’s brain activity such that if the neuroscope picks up any neural activity that indicates he will not vote for Bush, Jeb intervenes, adjusting Fred’s neural activity so that he does decide to vote for Bush. But as it turns out Fred decides to vote for Bush without Jeb having to intervene. Thus, there is a sufficient condition (i.e., Jeb with his neuroscope) to ensure the outcome of Fred’s deciding to vote for Bush but which does not actually impel, or cause, that outcome. Frankfurt suggests that, even though Fred has no alternative but to decide to vote for Bush, we would still say Fred is responsible for his decision, since Jeb played no role in it—Jeb could be subtracted from the situation and nothing would change about the actual outcome. Fred is responsible because he decides how to vote on his own. Yet, he could not have done otherwise, so PAP is false. 
	 There have been significant responses to Frankfurt cases,​[3]​ some of which I will discuss below, but for now I want to draw attention to the essential component of Frankfurt cases in order to highlight an important similarity with other arguments about free will. What I will call the ‘basic mechanism’ that makes Frankfurt cases work is the presence of sufficient conditions for an agent’s action or decision which do not intuitively mitigate the agent’s responsibility because they do not bring about (that is, cause) the action or decision. In Frankfurt cases the mechanism is a counterfactual intervener, hidden from the agent, which would intervene if need be but does not actually intervene. The mechanism is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the outcome by being a ‘backup’ cause of that outcome. Since the mechanism does not bring about the outcome, but instead the agent does, the agent still seems responsible for the outcome. Clever indeed. 
But perhaps not entirely new. There have been other cases in the free will debate from centuries past which involve a similar sort of basic mechanism, cases where there are sufficient conditions to ensure an agent’s action yet where the agent still seems free and responsible. That is, in some important sense, an agent is unable to do otherwise yet still acts of her own free will. The cases I have in mind are logical fatalism and God’s foreknowledge. Few philosophers have noted the connection between these cases and Frankfurt cases.​[4]​
Here’s the connection. Logical fatalism suggests that true statements are always true, so they have always been true (same with false statements). So, if it is true that you will vote for the Democratic presidential candidate at a particular time on November 4, 2008, then it is true now that you will vote Democrat at that time. Hence, there is a sufficient condition for your voting Democrat—the fact that it is true now that you will vote Democrat—such that, given that condition, you cannot do otherwise than vote Democrat. But this sufficient condition does not bring about your voting that way and hence, even though there is a sense in which you are unable to do otherwise, you still seem responsible for bringing about that event (we might say that the truth condition of the proposition in the present is determined by what you freely choose to do in the future). I’ll return later to responses one might offer to any apparent threat logical fatalism might pose to free will.
The threat to free will from God’s foreknowledge has a similar structure. If God has known since the beginning of time that you will choose to read this paper all the way to the very end, then you will choose to do so. His infallible knowledge is a sufficient condition for your choice, so again it seems that, given that condition, you are unable to choose otherwise (i.e., to stop reading). Yet his knowledge does not bring about your choice (again, we might say that what you freely choose to do in the present determines what God has always known you will do). I’ll also return to responses to this possible threat to free will. 
For now, simply note two points. First, there are interesting structural similarities between Frankfurt cases, logical fatalism, and God’s foreknowledge: the ‘basic mechanism’ in each case involves the presence of a sufficient condition for an agent’s action that does not actually bring about the action. Furthermore, this condition is hidden to the agent—that is, the agent does not know the outcome for which there is a sufficient condition, preserving the agent’s ‘epistemic freedom’, her belief that alternative actions are open to her depending on which choice she makes. Finally, this basic mechanism suggests that what is important for freedom and responsibility is that the agent plays the right role in bringing about her action, not that she have alternative possibilities available to her. Frankfurt thus concludes that free will and moral responsibility do not require an agent to have metaphysical freedom—that is, freedom to choose among open alternatives given the actual circumstances.​[5]​ For roughly similar reasons, logical fatalism and God’s foreknowledge have been largely dismissed as conclusive threats to freedom and responsibility.
Having suggested these connections among some traditional challenges to free will and Frankfurt cases, let me suggest that there are also interesting connections with the problem of determinism—which, despite Frankfurt’s ideas, has certainly not been dismissed as a threat to freedom and responsibility. Keeping this in mind, let’s turn to the Consequence argument.

3. The Consequence Argument
Around the same time Frankfurt introduced his response to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, Peter van Inwagen, among others, was developing the Consequence argument, which then revitalized incompatibilism, and with it, libertarianism.​[6]​ An informal version of the argument goes like this: 
If determinism is true then our actions are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But we have no choice about the laws of nature or events in the remote past. So, we have no choice about the consequences of these things, including our own actions. 
The formal version of the argument defines determinism as the claim that a proposition about the state of the universe at one time (P) in conjunction with the laws of nature (L) logically entails any proposition about the state of the universe at another time, or at least at any future time (F). If determinism is true, then it follows that: □[(P & L) → F]. (This says that determinism entails that a particular past and laws are logically sufficient for, or strictly imply, a particular future.) Van Inwagen then introduces a modal operator ‘N’ that attaches to propositions such that ‘Np’ means “p is true and no one has a choice about p.” The concept of ‘choice’ at issue is, of course, central to the debate about free will and moral responsibility. I will follow van Inwagen in leaving the concept of ‘choice’ involved in the N-operator intuitive and uninterpreted, such that it reads, in his words: “Np =df p and in just the sense of having a choice that is relevant in debates about moral responsibility, no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p” (1983: 105).​[7]​
Van Inwagen then introduces two rules of inference for the use of the N-operator:
Rule Alpha: □p entails Np. (This says that no one has a choice about necessary truths—for instance, you can’t do anything about the fact that nothing weighs more than itself.)
Rule Beta: Np and N(p → q) entail Nq. (This says that if no one has a choice about p and no one has a choice about the fact that p implies q, then no one has a choice about q.)
Alpha seems uncontroversial, whereas Beta has generated much controversy. Van Inwagen originally suggested that Beta is valid because it seems intuitive and he could not think of any counterexamples to it. But philosophers, such as MacKay and Johnson, did come up with counterexamples to it.​[8]​ Then, in response, Ted Warfield offered a new inference rule which is immune to these counterexamples.​[9]​ He calls it Beta-box which says: Np and □(p → q) entail Nq. (This reads: if no one has a choice about p and it is a necessary truth that p implies q, then no has a choice about q.) 
With Beta-box, the Consequence argument (which originally had seven steps) becomes short and simple. However, it requires seeing the laws of nature as a part of the past—that is, the laws are facts fixed by the state of the world in the distant past, a claim I’ll examine below. Given this stipulation, let PL be a proposition describing ‘the complete state of the actual world in the distant past, including all its laws’ and let F be a proposition describing the complete state of the world at some later time (including a particular action—say, how you will vote on Nov. 4, 2008):
1) □ (PL → F)		Consequence of determinism.
2) NPL			Premise.​[10]​
3) NF			1,2 Beta-box.
So, (if we generalize from F to include any time and thus all actions) the argument shows that if determinism is true, then in just the sense of choice relevant to moral responsibility, no one has a choice about anything they do—for instance, you have no choice about how you will vote in 2008. This is a powerful conclusion. How might a compatibilist respond?
	Compatibilists need to accept premise 1 conditionally even if they think it’s false, since they aim to show that freedom and responsibility are possible even if determinism were true. So the compatibilist has to show either that (1) the argument is invalid, presumably because rule Beta-box is invalid, (2) the argument is unsound, presumably because premise 2 is false, or (3) that the argument is sound only if it uses a concept of choice for the N-operator that is not in fact relevant to debates about moral responsibility, so that the conclusion is not threatening. Part of my goal is to offer some support for each of these responses.
The first thing to notice about this argument is that it is not stated in terms of causation of present events by past events (as governed by the laws of nature). As van Inwagen says, “the horrible little word ‘cause’ does not appear in this definition [of determinism]. Causation is a morass in which I for one refuse to set foot. Or not unless I am pushed” (1983: 65). Indeed, I will try to push him into that morass below, since, as we will see, without the idea that past events as governed by the laws are causing, or bringing about, what the agent does, the Consequence argument loses much of its intuitive force. 
As it is, the first premise of the Consequence argument is stated not in terms of causation but in terms of a logical entailment, such that the antecedent (PL) is a logically sufficient condition for the consequent (the outcome F).​[11]​ This should remind us, then, of the ‘basic mechanism’ of Frankfurt cases discussed above—the existence of a sufficient condition for a certain outcome, such as an action (the second part of the mechanism, that the condition does not bring about the action, will be a central issue below, bringing us back to the question of causation). To try to display this similarity, I will present arguments involving logical fatalism, God’s foreknowledge, and Frankfurt cases using the same structure as the three-step Consequence argument outlined above. We will then have to see whether there are interesting differences between these ‘progeny’ arguments and their parent.

4. Progeny #1: Logical fatalism
Let logical fatalism be the claim that if a proposition F describing the state of the world at a particular time, say on Nov. 4, 2008, is true, then it has always been true, so that it was true at some time in the distant past. Let PT be the proposition describing “the complete state of the actual world at a time in the distant past including all of the true propositions about the actual world at other times”. The Consequence-style argument then proceeds as follows:
1) □ (PT → F)		Consequence of logical fatalism. 
2) NPT			Premise. 
3) NF			1,2 Beta-box.
As in the Consequence argument, the first premise states that there is a sufficient condition in the complete description of the distant past that logically entails propositions about the future, and the second premise states that no one can do anything about conditions in the distant past. The conclusion reads: if logical fatalism is true, then in just the sense of choice relevant to moral responsibility, no one has a choice about what propositions will be true in the future (including, for instance, the truth about how you will vote for President in 2008).
But even supposing logical fatalism to be correct, the conclusion does not seem to be true: even if statements about the future are true now, we still seem to have a choice in the relevant (moral responsibility) sense about what we do. This may give solace to the compatibilist by suggesting that the form of the Consequence argument, namely its essential rule Beta-box, is just too powerful; it can prove too much. This may be (I am trying to put pressure on transfer principles like Beta-box), but incompatibilists who want to maintain the validity of the Consequence argument are likely to reply that its not Beta-box that’s the problem here; it’s premise 2.​[12]​ 
Premise 2 is false, they will say, because we do have a choice about the past, if the past is described in this broad way to include all the true propositions about the future. We have a choice about what we do now and what we do now determines what was true in the past relative to later times (the truth value of PT is responsive to what happens in the future relative to the time of P, including our choices at F). Though there may appear to be some backwards causation here, it’s not that current contingent truths, such as our choices, cause anything to happen in the past; rather, they serve as the ‘truth makers’ for those propositions in the past that are about these future contingent truths. In a possible world where I choose to vote Democrat in 2008, the proposition “[Author] votes Democrat in 2008” is true at all times in that world, but in a possible world where I choose to vote Republican, the proposition “[Author] votes Republican in 2008” is true at all times in that world. And so on. What makes the propositions true is not anything that happens in the past, but what happens when it happens. So, since NPT is false, the argument is unsound and NF need not follow. We’ll shortly see a similar response to the Consequence-style arguments about God’s foreknowledge and Frankfurt cases. But then we might wonder whether such a response is available in response to the Consequence argument itself—and if not, why not. So, let’s look at the second progeny of the Consequence argument, the problem of God’s foreknowledge.

5. Progeny #2: God’s Foreknowledge
In any world with an essentially omniscient God, God knows everything at all times.​[13]​ So, for any true proposition in that world, God knew when He created the world that the proposition is true. Let PG be the proposition describing “the complete state of the world in the past, including God’s infallible knowledge about later times”, and let F be any true proposition (for instance, about who you will vote for in 2008). The Consequence-style argument then proceeds:
1) □ (PG → F)		Consequence of God’s Foreknowledge.
2) NPG		Premise. 
3) NF			1,2 Beta-box.
Again, as in the Consequence argument, the first premise states that there is a sufficient condition in the complete description of the distant past that logically entails propositions about the future, and the second premise states that no one can do anything about the distant past. The conclusion then reads: if God exists and is omniscient, then in just the sense of choice relevant to moral responsibility, no one has a choice about anything (including, for instance, how you will vote in 2008).
	Perhaps not coincidentally, some libertarians about free will are also theists who accept the existence of an omniscient God but certainly do not accept the conclusion of this argument. And libertarians also reject compatibilist conceptions of free will (theists perhaps due to these conceptions being insufficient to justify divine punishment and reward or to provide a response to the problem of evil). Hence, they will want to accept the Consequence argument (and Beta-like rules). Such libertarians then will have to reject premise 2 of this argument.
	Indeed, the most common response to the problem of divine foreknowledge is similar to the response to logical fatalism outlined above. In this case, the argument against premise 2, NPG, rests on the claim that we do have a choice about the complete state of the world in the past including God’s knowledge, because we have a choice about what God knows, and this is because what God knows depends on what we freely choose to do. (The truth value of some of the propositions included in PG about what God knows is responsive to what happens in the future relative to time P, such as free choices we make at the time of F.) Traditionally, some facts about what God knows in the past about the future are called ‘soft facts’ because they are about contingent events that have yet to occur. ‘Hard facts’ about the past, in contrast, refer only to events that have already occurred at or before that time in the past.​[14]​ If this Consequence-style argument fails, then, it is because we do have a choice about ‘soft facts’, those facts about God’s knowledge in the past whose truth depends on events, such as our choices, that occur at later times. 
	Again, one of my aims in developing these parallel arguments is to see whether the sort of response available to block their conclusions may also be available to block the conclusion of the Consequence argument, and if not, to see what the relevant difference is. First, let’s look at one more progeny of the Consequence argument that may put more pressure on its validity.

6. Progeny #3: Frankfurt cases
Remember that Frankfurt cases are designed to set up sufficient conditions that ensure an agent’s action such that the agent could not do otherwise, yet that leave the agent, intuitively, free and responsible for her action. This should remind us of the arguments I just outlined, each of which begins with a premise describing sufficient conditions for some outcome. In a Frankfurt-case progeny of the Consequence argument, the first premise would say: Necessarily, if the Frankfurt intervener is in place, the agent will act in a particular way (call it F and for ease of discussion, let’s make it “Ann’s voting Democrat on Nov. 4, 2008”). It is important to note here that, just as in the Consequence argument, where the first premise picks out just those possible worlds with the same past and laws, in this case the first premise picks out just the possible worlds with the same past and laws as well as an intervener sufficiently powerful and disposed to ensure that a particular future outcome occurs. The second premise seems to be in place, too, since the agent has no choice about the past, including the existence of the Frankfurt intervener—after all, she doesn’t even know the intervener exists. So, the Consequence-style argument reads:
1) □ (PI → F)		Consequence of Frankfurt intervener.
2) NPI			Premise.
3) NF			1,2 Beta-box.​[15]​
But as in the case of logical fatalism and God’s foreknowledge, it seems that the conclusion (NF) does not hold, since when the agent acts on her own, without the intervener actually intervening, she certainly seems to be free and responsible—after all, the intervener could be subtracted from the situation and nothing would change about what the agent actually does. 
An incompatibilist who does not want to bite the counterintuitive bullet of insisting that in such cases Ann does not vote freely, and who also does not want to give up the backbone of the Consequence argument, the Beta rule, will have to find some flaw in this offspring of that argument. He might suggest that I have been sneaky in my presentation: Do I mean F to read “Ann votes Democrat” or to read “Ann votes Democrat on her own”? If it’s the latter, “Ann votes on her own”, then the first premise fails, since the intervener might have had to intervene—that is, given PI, it is possible that F, on this reading, is false. And, the objection continues, if F just reads “Ann votes Democrat” then the conclusion is true, since she in fact has no choice about whether this outcome occurs. I certainly mean F to read the latter, “Ann votes Democrat”, but I maintain that the conclusion is still false. Remember that NF here reads: “Ann votes Democrat and in just the sense of choice relevant in debates about moral responsibility, Ann had no choice about voting Democrat.” My intuition follows Frankfurt’s that in any world in which the intervener does not actually intervene, this conclusion is false; though Ann could not bring about a different outcome, she acted on her own deliberations and reasons, without being manipulated, so she seems accountable for her action. This despite the fact that the first premise is true—in all possible worlds containing this Frankfurt intervener (i.e., where PI is true), Ann votes Democrat (i.e., F is true).​[16]​ Such Frankfurt cases suggest that it is the actual sequence of events leading up to an agent’s action that matters in assessing her responsibility—the existence of unactualized alternatives is irrelevant.​[17]​
	Another way the incompatibilist might respond to this Consequence-style argument is to follow the strategy employed against the other progeny arguments and argue that the second premise is false. It’s not that the agent can do anything about the existence of the Frankfurt intervener, but she may be able to do something about whether the intervener actually intervenes. If we read PI as the state of the past, including not just the existence of the Frankfurt intervener but also whether or not the intervener has to intervene to ensure F, then perhaps NPI is false. So, even if Ann chooses to vote Democrat on her own, she could have done something such that, if she had, the intervener would have had to intervene to ensure she voted Democrat. Perhaps she was free to begin to choose in such a way that the intervener would have to intervene to ensure the outcome. 
	Here the debate about Frankfurt cases becomes very complex, but the basic question is whether or not a Frankfurt case can be developed that cuts off all alternatives robust enough to call choices for which an agent is responsible.​[18]​ For instance, if making a choice is a temporally extended process that involves, say, a sequence of neural activity, then the Frankfurt intervener can intervene as soon as he sees any neural activity indicating that the agent will not make the desired choice, in which case the agent can never complete an alternative choice (such as to vote Republican).​[19]​ So, the agent does not have a choice about whether the intervener intervenes. At best something could happen such that, if it did, the intervener would have to intervene to ensure that Ann votes Democrat, but Ann does not have a choice about whether that ‘something’ happens. So NPI is still true. If so, since the premises are true and the conclusion NF is false, there seems to be a problem with the form of the Consequence argument, presumably with rule Beta-box or the concept of choice being employed in the N-operator.
	I am not suggesting Frankfurt cases win the day for compatibilists. I’ve made some controversial claims to back up my case that this progeny of the Consequence argument puts pressure on the parent argument—for instance, that making choices is a temporally extended process, the early stages of which are beyond an agent’s control, and also that Frankfurt’s intuitions are in fact the right ones to have.​[20]​ But, given such assumptions, my construction of a Consequence-style argument using a Frankfurt-intervener puts pressure on the structure of the Consequence argument itself, especially the intuitive appeal of the validity of rule Beta-box as applied to the conception of choice relevant to moral responsibility. Now I will use my construction of these progeny arguments to apply another type of pressure to the incompatibilist’s argument.   

7. Lewis-style Compatibilism
One response to each of the progeny arguments I’ve outlined is to reject premise 2. In each case, the incompatibilist who wants to maintain the validity of the Consequence argument and Beta-box can argue that we do have a choice about the truth conditions of the past, when the past is meant to include propositions about the future, or about God’s foreknowledge, or perhaps even about the actions a Frankfurt intervener must take to ensure a particular outcome (though I’m skeptical about this last move). In possible-worlds talk, what we do now picks out which possible world, including which possible past, is the actual world. We might wonder, then, whether a similar response may be employed against the incompatibilist’s Consequence argument. The incompatibilist will, of course, have to argue that such a move is not available. Indeed, they will take it as obvious that the laws of nature are fixed by the past state of the universe, and ask how anyone could think that we have a choice about what the past or the laws of nature are. 
Well, some pretty clever philosophers, like David Lewis, have thought this move does make sense.​[21]​ Such compatibilists do not make the absurd claim that we have a choice about what the actual laws are—we cannot act in a way that violates what is in fact a law of nature (e.g., if Einstein’s laws are in fact true, then I can’t move my hand faster than the speed of light). Rather, the claim is that premise 2 of the Consequence argument, NPL, may be false because sometimes when we act, we could have acted otherwise, such that if we had acted otherwise, the laws of nature would have been different than they actually are. One way to see what this confusing claim means is to see it as parallel to the responses I outlined to fatalism and God’s foreknowledge. For instance, if God has always known I will vote Democrat in 2008, then it’s true that I will vote Democrat—I can’t change what God actually knows (He is omniscient). However, I can do something—vote Republican—such that were I to do it, then what God knows would be different than it actually is. Facts about what God knows in the past about the future are ‘soft facts’ that depend on what actually happens in the future. Similarly, facts about the laws of nature may be seen as ‘soft facts’ because they depend on what actually happens, including what choices we make. Again, the idea is not that our choices can change the actual laws of nature any more than our choices can change what God actually knew long ago, but rather which laws are actual is counterfactually dependent on the choices we actually make, just as what God knows is counterfactually dependent on the choices we actually make. In possible-worlds talk, what we actually do now among our possible alternatives establishes which possible world, including which possible laws, is the actual world and the actual laws. While it may seem counterintuitive to claim that we can do something such that, if we did it, the laws would be different than they actually are, we can now see that this response has the same basic form as the responses the libertarian is likely to give to the progeny arguments I discussed.​[22]​   
	Of course, incompatibilists will likely claim that there is an important difference between the laws of nature and God’s foreknowledge. Warfield says that, unlike the ‘truth maker’ for God’s knowledge about certain future propositions, the ‘truth maker’ for the laws of nature “obtained before any agents existed” (1996, p. 216). Lewis, however, suggests that the ‘truth maker’ for the laws of nature depends on what actually happens, including how agents actually act. This claim that the laws of nature are not fixed by the state of the universe in the distant past may be hard to swallow. But it depends on what view of laws you take. Lewis takes a Humean or regularity view that says the laws describe the regularities among events, which are not fixed until all events have occurred—after, for instance, humans have made all of their choices. A necessitarian about laws rejects this view, believing that the laws are part of the structure of the universe that explains why one state of affairs necessarily follows another state of affairs.​[23]​ I’m not sure which side to take on this issue, but let me suggest two consequences of this debate for the question of free will.​[24]​ 
First, it should now be clear that the Consequence argument does not work from the premise of determinism, if described just in terms of there being sufficient conditions in the past for our actions, combined with rule Beta-box—after all, the progeny arguments share these features. Rather, the second premise of the argument does all the important work. If the Consequence argument is to be distinguished from its less threatening progeny, it must shore up the second premise by relying on a conception of laws of nature that makes them have a one-way force from the past to the present, such that the past and laws are not just sufficient to ensure what happens in the future but also to bring about what happens in the future (remember the crucial second feature of the basic mechanism of Frankfurt cases). It’s not just that the laws and the past are sufficient conditions for our actions, but that they are causally sufficient conditions for our actions. For determinism to be a problem, it requires a particular conception of the laws of nature, specifically that they exist as part of the past and are not responsive to, but rather, in conjunction with past events, bring about, what we do. Put simply, determinism is a problem if the laws of nature are seen as ‘forces’ that are out of our control rather than the laws being descriptions of the regular patterns of events in the universes, including events that are in our control. Looking back at the formulation of determinism in premise 1 of the Consequence argument, it is not the box and arrow of this formulation that pose the problem; it is, as it were, the ‘nomic force’ that carries through the arrow from the facts about the past and laws in the antecedent to the facts described in the consequent, a force explicitly missing from the progeny arguments.​[25]​ In short, the Consequence argument’s success seems to depend on the truth of a necessitarian conception of laws of nature. 
If an incompatibilist does accept this necessitarian view of laws, then he should worry that even if the laws are indeterministic, that would not help secure the kind of choice at issue in the Consequence argument. If the laws involve probabilistic rather than deterministic causal relations, we can run a Consequence-style argument that looks like this: 
If indeterminism (of this sort) is true, then our actions are the (probabilistic) consequences of the past and the laws of nature. But we have no choice about the past and we have no choice about the laws of nature, including the objective probabilities of certain outcomes occurring. So, we have no choice about the consequences of these things, including the probability of one action occurring rather than another.​[26]​ 
So, if the Consequence argument works by importing a necessitarian conception of laws, it may then be so powerful that it entails that free will is impossible—ruled out by both determinism and indeterminism. If so, then libertarians need to find a way to respond to this skeptical argument without giving up its parent argument.
Second, I want to suggest that the Lewis-style response to the Consequence argument is not as counter-intuitive as it might at first appear. The best way to understand this sort of response is to see it as suggesting that at least some laws of nature are not fixed by the state of the world in the distant past.​[27]​ Rather, it does seem that, at least if one is not a reductionist about laws of nature, then certain laws will only come into existence when the entities they describe come into existence. Biological laws, if there are any, do not exist until the relevant biological entities exist. More significant for our interests, psychological laws, if there are any, might not exist until the relevant psychological creatures exist. Perhaps these laws, even if they supervene on physical laws, do not exist until the physical world is organized in the appropriate way, in the same way that the Mona Lisa does not exist until the particles on which it supervenes are organized in the appropriate way.​[28]​ 
More importantly, what the psychological laws actually are would depend on what human agents actually do—specifically on the regularities that exist between our conscious deliberations and our actions. In that case, the laws need not be seen as ‘forces’ that produce our thoughts and actions and are out of our control but rather as descriptions of patterns of events, including the thoughts and actions which, intuitively, are in our control. It’s not that our conscious choices need to have the contra-causal powers suggested by agent causation, but that they are essential components of the counterfactual laws that describe certain events, such as choices. Just as we can see the timeless truths of the past or God’s foreknowledge as describing, but not controlling, our actual choices, we can see the laws of nature as describing, but not controlling, patterns of events involving our actual choices. 
One challenge to this sort of view involves certain forms of reductionism—those that suggest the regularities described by psychological laws can be explained by regularities existing at a more fundamental level, such as neural events, which do not refer to conscious processes. This, in fact, is the destination I’ve been taking this long and circuitous route to reach: The problem of free will is not the problem posed by determinism but rather the problem posed by certain forms of reductionism. The threat to freedom is not that our actions may have sufficient causes in the distant past but that they may have lower-level proximate causes, causes involving processes at, say, the neural level, that do not make reference to the self-reflective conscious processes we value when we consider free will. Certain forms of reductionism entail that conscious mental processes are at best accurate but redundant descriptions of the processes that cause all behavior, and are at worst inaccurate and thus eliminable descriptions of the real causal processes. It is these reductionistic views of the laws of nature that are suggested by the view of determinism invoked by the workable Consequence argument: since the laws of nature are fixed by facts that exist before the existence of any conscious agents—that is, by the state of the physical world in the distant past—the psychological laws must be reducible to the physical laws that existed in the distant past (perhaps shortly after the Big Bang). 
Of course, I can’t argue here that such reductionistic views of the mind-body relation are mistaken—I’m not sure they are. But to see more clearly what the potential threat to free will is, let me conclude by presenting one more progeny of the Consequence argument, one involving the notion of supervenience.

8. Progeny #4: Strong Supervenience
Suppose strong supervenience is true, such that mental processes and states such as conscious deliberations and decisions supervene on their physical substrates: for instance, in order for a different decision to occur, there must be a difference in the physical substrate.​[29]​ Thus, given the actual laws, a particular distribution of physical particles in space-time is logically sufficient for a particular mental state. Well, once we see the basic mechanism of such a sufficient condition, we should recognize the possibility of constructing a Consequence-style argument. In this case, let SL be a true proposition describing the distributions of physical particles at a particular time and all the laws of nature (including any ‘supervenience laws’). And let M be a true proposition about all the mental states and processes (such as deliberations and decisions) at that time. Then it looks like we can run a Consequence-style argument:
1) □ (SL → M)	Consequence of Supervenience.
2) NSL			Premise.
3) NM			1,2 Beta-box.
What this argument says is that if strong supervenience is true, then in just the sense of choice relevant to MR, no one has a choice about what mental states he or she is in (including, for instance, decisions). Note that the proposition S in this argument refers not to the actual past but to the actual present and its current distribution of physical particles. This difference with the other Consequence-style arguments allows us to notice an important consequence of this argument: it works equally well in an indeterministic world as a deterministic world. Even if the distribution of physical particles is not deterministically caused by previous distributions of particles, the supervenience relation can still hold. Again, this should remind us that it may not be determinism that is the problem for free will but a particular conception of the laws (that is, a necessitarian and reductionistic conception).
Libertarians and compatibilists may respond to this supervenience argument in different ways. Libertarians may be inclined to reject premise 1—to reject at least this formulation of supervenience. Agent causationists are especially apt to do so since they will either be substance dualists or suggest, as does Tim O’Connor, that agents do not supervene on their physical constituents but emerge from them (suggesting a sort of property dualism).​[30]​ 
Compatibilists are more likely to accept supervenience (because they may think it is entailed by a naturalism they find plausible), in which case they might reject Beta-box, perhaps using this argument as a counterexample to it, or they might reject the second premise which claims that we have no choice about the current distribution of physical particles in space-time. The rejection of premise 2 should look familiar. It’s not that we can do something now to change the current distribution of physical particles—that’s absurd. Rather, it’s that even if I actually do A at time t2, I am able at t1 to do B at t2 in that, were I to do B at t2, then the distribution of particles would be different at t2. (For example, though I’ve kept my hand down now, I could have raised it, and if I had raised it then lots of particles would be distributed differently than they actually are.) Perhaps this response, which parallels viable responses to the other Consequence-style arguments, can allow us to be compatibilists about free will and strong supervenience.​[31]​

9. Conclusion
I have presented arguments on both sides of the free will debate in a way that allows us to see more clearly what it is about determinism that is potentially threatening to free will. It is not just that determinism entails that there are sufficient conditions to ensure what we do (as suggested by the bare bones definition of it), but rather, for incompatibilist arguments to have any bite, determinism must be seen as entailing that there are sufficient conditions to bring about what we do such that we are helpless to do anything about those sufficient conditions—not just because they are in the past but because they are part of the structure of our world that is outside of our control. The compatibilist, one way or another, needs to reject the Consequence argument. He can do so by finding problems with rule Beta-box, and I’ve tried to present Frankfurt cases as a possible counterexample to that rule. Or he can reject premise 2 of the argument, just as the libertarian might reject premise 2 of the various progeny arguments—and in a similar way, by denying that the laws are ‘hard facts’ fixed by the past. Rather, the actual laws are fixed in part by what we actually do. Incompatibilists, in turn, have the strongest position if they insist both that free will requires (metaphysically open) alternative possibilities and that the laws are fixed by the past and necessitate our actions.​[32]​ Perhaps the trickiest position to hold is the libertarians’ because they must show both that compatibilism is not viable and that indeterminism can help secure free will, and I’ve suggested that the latter may be hard to do if one takes a necessitarian view of laws. 
Indeed, I suspect that it is this reductionistic and necessitarian view of determinism that leads to, in Peter Strawson’s words, the “panicky metaphysics” of libertarianism, especially agent causation.​[33]​ Such libertarians imagine that determinism entails that the universe is a clockwork mechanism that leaves no room for conscious agents to play a part in the mechanism—so, in response, they posit the existence of irreducible agents, not fully part of the mechanism, who can make a causal difference in how the mechanism unwinds. Compatibilists, I think, must hope that there is a plausible way to describe the mechanism and its laws that takes into account agents and their conscious deliberations and choices—that is, a description that makes our minds matter. This is the big picture I hope my tour through the free will debate has painted for us: that the incompatibilist recognizes that if it’s the micro-physical laws that govern everything that happens, our conscious mental states get left out of the picture, and with them, our freedom and responsibility. The compatibilist, in turn, recognizes that if the laws that govern everything must take into account our conscious mental activity, then we don’t get left out of the picture—the psychological abilities, like deliberation, that we associate with free and responsible action count as real abilities that make a real difference in the physical world. If compatibilists can, in this way, avoid the reductive mechanism that is mistakenly associated with determinism, they may be able to develop a theory of free will that captures our libertarian yearnings without requiring the problematic metaphysics of most libertarian views.
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